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  Abstract 
 
The purpose of this research is to analyse the impact of the ECB’s unconventional monetary 
policies on European Stock Markets since the beginning of the financial crisis. In order to do 
so, I conduct an event study founded on the application of three different models, which are 
robust to the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of daily stock returns. My results suggest 
that the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy announcements had significant and positive 
effects on Italian, Spanish and Portuguese equities. Contrarily, the impact is negative for 
German stocks. Regarding the industries, the highest positive impact was on the banking sector. 
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During recent years, the Eurozone felt the impact of the economic crisis in different ways. 
Firstly, the relatively fragile banking sector was facing large capital losses, which contributed 
to a liquidity drought in the “real economy”. Secondly, various countries’ economies, 
particularly the ones with vast Government debt levels, were affected by the rapidly rising bond 
yield spreads. In order to respond to these challenges, the ECB started by cutting policy rates, 
with these reaching the zero lower bound. However, given the magnitude of the crisis, and the 
structure of the Eurozone, which is a currency union without fiscal union, the ECB had to follow 
other central bank’s actions and implement non-standard policies. Nonetheless, there is still 
disagreement regarding the effectiveness of ECB’s unconventional measures. While some 
commented that the polices reduced redenomination and default risks and improved the health 
of the banking system, others argue that such measures diminish the need for fiscal discipline, 
create all sorts of moral hazard problems and could lead to inflation or asset bubbles (Belke, 
2013). 
Most of the previous literature is focused on the effects of ECB’s unconventional policies on 
government bond yields, interbank rates and credit default swap markets. However, it is always 
important to examine how monetary policy intervention influences stock market returns. 
Theoretically, if we consider the dividend discount model for equity valuation, we can see that 
monetary policy can affect stock prices by changing the discount rate for future cash flows and 
by potentially affecting the output in the short to medium term (Kontonikas & Kostakis, 2013). 
Additionally, monetary policy influences the way market agents perceive future economic 
conditions, thereby impacting their asset allocation decisions via the expectations channel 
(Falagiarda & Reitz, 2015) .  
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With the former ideas in mind, I decided to conduct an event study approach in order to find 
whether ECB’s unconventional monetary policy announcements had statistically significant 
effects on European Stock Markets. Following the approach suggested by Krishnamurthy et al. 
(2014), I use a time-series dummy variable regression. The model includes dummies for six 
ECB unconventional programs (LTRO, CBPP, SMP, OMT, TLTRO and APP) and it is applied 
for twelve national and nineteen sectorial stock indices. Since my daily stock returns data is 
characterized by the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) method is no longer the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) (Brown & 
Warner, 1985).  Consequently, in order to adjust the covariance matrix for heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation, I decided to follow the methodology applied by Ioannidis & Kontonikas 
(2008) and use Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags.  
The analysis of the announcements suggests that some of them were not considerably 
meaningful for stock investors. Therefore, in order to find which ones were significant enough 
to affect the equity markets, I follow the approach of Galariotis et al. (2017) and specify which 
of these ECB announcements were covered by Financial Times’ headline articles. Then, I use 
a time-series dummy variable regression that only takes into account the “Important 
Announcements”. Following Falagiarda & Reitz (2015), I also decided to look for anticipation 
and delayed effects. 
In addition to the previous two models, I decided to conduct another regression, which builds 
on the methodology of Rogers et al. (2014) and Haitsma et al. (2015). This approach uses the 
yield spread between German and Italian 10-year government bonds at the day of an ECB 
announcement, in order to find unconventional monetary policy surprises and study their impact 
on equity markets. 
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Previewing our results, we find that the SMP and APP programs had a positive influence on the 
stock markets of peripheral nations. Nevertheless, the impacts of other programs are mostly 
insignificant for European equities. Taking into account the model that includes only the 
“Important Announcements”, the results confirm that ECB unconventional monetary policy 
announcements benefited the peripheral European stock markets, which is in accordance with 
the findings of earlier literature. However, the measures led to negative abnormal returns in 
German stocks. Moreover, the results indicate mostly insignificant anticipation and delayed 
announcement effects. Finally, the results for the third model show that an announcement that 
causes a decrease in the yield spread between German and Italian government bonds also leads 
to an increase in the returns of stock indices, for the IPS countries.  
At an industry level, the results for the various ECB programs show less significant effects, and 
only for the SMP and APP programs. However, in the case of the second model, which 
considers the “Important Announcements”, the results show evidence of significant and 
positive effects on the Banking sector, but also on the Real Estate and Insurance industries’ 
stock returns. In terms of anticipation and delayed effects, there is no evidence of their 
existence. Finally, the results for the third model, which considers the measure of 
unconventional policy surprises, are in line with the aforementioned findings.  
In summary, this thesis contributes to the existing literature in four ways. First, I examine the 
impact of ECB unconventional monetary policy on stock prices, by distinguishing the effects 
of six programs. Second, I analyse the magnitude of the announcements with the objective of 
finding which ones are more meaningful for the common equity investor.  Third, for my event 
study, I build on the methodology of other authors and use three different models which are 
robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of daily stock data. Lastly, I study the effects 
of ECB’s unconventional policy on both domestic and industry stock indices. 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The following section contains theoretical 
content that analyses the ECB’s Monetary Policy. Section 3 examines the previous literature on 
this subject. Section 4 outlines the different hypotheses for the event study. Section 5 outlines 
my data and methodology. Following that, section 6 presents my results and section 7 concludes 
and describes the limitations of this work. 
2. The ECB’s Monetary Policy 
2.1 Objectives and Instruments of Monetary Policy 
According to the Maastricht Treaty, the primary objective of the ECB’s monetary policy is to 
maintain price stability (European Central Bank, 2017). Although the Treaty does not specify 
a definition of price stability, the ECB’s Governing Council aims at keeping euro area inflation 
levels below, but close to 2% over the medium term.  The maintenance of relatively stable 
prices is a key fundamental to achieve economic growth and welfare. The stability of prices in 
the EU brings more transparency and confidence to the market, increasing consumption, 
investment and employment. 
The ECB monetary policy is based on the constant analysis of economic and monetary 
conditions, which guide the ECB’s Governing Council decisions. The Council meets every 
month to analyse the Euro economic environment and decide on the appropriate level of the 
key interest rates (European Central Bank, 2017), which are described below: 
 The interest rate on the main refinancing operations (MRO): in the form of a fixed 
or a variable rate, it provides the bulk of liquidity to the banking system. It is the 
equivalent to the U.S federal funds rate. 
 The rate on the deposit facility: it is the rate paid by the ECB for money deposited 
overnight by euro area banks. 
 The rate on marginal lending facility: it is the rate that banks pay in order to obtain 
overnight credit from the Euro system. It acts as a last resort for banks. 
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Besides influencing the rates in the Eurozone, the ECB also manages the liquidity supply 
through regular open market operations. These can be divided in two main types: the Main 
Refinancing Operations (MROs) and the Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs). 
MROs serve to provide liquidity in a weekly basis to the banks. They are used to “steer short-
term interest rates, to manage the liquidity situation and to signal the monetary policy stance in 
the euro area” (European Central Bank, 2017). LTROs offer liquidity for a period of 3 months. 
“They provide additional, longer-term refinancing to the financial sector”. Apart from the 
MROs and LTROs, the ECB can use fine-tuning operations to quickly respond to unforeseen 
changes in the liquidity supply in the money markets (De Nederlandsche Bank, 2017). 
Lastly, the ECB can also use communication policies to conduct monetary strategy. 
Communication can be used to explain decisions, describe policies’ objectives and results, and 
provide forward guidance. Due to the risk of loss of credibility and reputation and the presence 
of unusually negative conditions, central banks’ communication became a stronger element of 
monetary policy during the crisis. 
2.2 ECB Unconventional Policies 
Unconventional monetary policies can be defined as a class of operations that use central banks’ 
balance sheets in order to directly affect a broader set of market rates, asset prices and even 
lending amounts (Meier, 2009). In short, they act by changing the market agents’ expectations 
and rebalancing their portfolios (Falagiarda & Reitz, 2015). 
In the case of the ECB, while during normal times weekly main refinancing operations were 
considered the main policy instrument to provide liquidity to the banking sector, in order to 
respond to the negative economic conditions, the Central Bank has been acting along different 
dimensions. These recent ECB interventions included the following characteristics: 
 Maturity transformation - ECB increased the maturities of repurchasing operations; 
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 Liquidity transformation - Illiquid assets were accepted as collateral for new asset 
purchases programs; 
 Transaction services - ECB started to accept new counterparties as eligible; 
 Adverse selection - Through new programs, the ECB absorbed the counterparties’ 
credit risk. 
Apart from these actions, other works consider the negative deposit facility rates to be part of 
the unconventional policies (Pereira, 2016). Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study, 
unconventional monetary measures will not be considered. 
Although the theory advocates that unconventional operations work, this kind of monetary 
policies involves more uncertainty than conventional measures, regarding the economic impact 
of operations (Meier, 2009). Consequently, it is important to analyse its effects. 
2.3 The Unconventional programs   
In this section, the main ECB non-standard programs, whose impact on the stock markets is 
studied in this research, will be described. 
Longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs)  
Before the crisis, LTROs were conducted through competitive tenders in which each bank 
demanded an amount of liquidity and offered an interest rate to remunerate the Central Bank. 
Whilst the total amount of liquidity to be allotted was predetermined, only the highest interest 
rate bids were satisfied. In implementing the recent unconventional monetary policy measures, 
the ECB changed the scope of LTROs, which are now conducted with fixed rate tenders and 
full allotment procedure and have become the main source of funding for banks (Rivolta, 2014).  
In August 2007, the ECB initiated its complementary liquidity measures through the 
announcement of the first supplementary LTRO, with three-month maturity. During March 
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2008, the Central Bank introduced 6-month maturity LTROs. Later on, in October 2008, it 
decided to increase the frequency and size of LTROs, as well as to adopt a fixed rate tender 
procedure with full allotment. Lastly, during December 2008, the Governing Council 
announced two LTROs with a three-year maturity and the option of early repayment after one 
year. The first was allotted in the end of December and the second in February of the following 
year. 
Covered bond purchase programs (CBPPs) 
Covered bonds are bonds issued by banks or credit institutions, which are collateralized against 
a group of assets. In the case of default of the issuer, covered bonds grant the holder the 
possibility of claiming that pool of assets. The covered bond market is the most important 
privately issued bond segment in Europe and is one of the main sources of banks’ funding for 
mortgage lending (Rivolta, 2014).  
With the beginning of the financial crisis, investors switched their preferences towards less 
risky assets, such as government bonds. Hence, in order to increase the liquidity in private debt 
security markets, banks’ funding conditions and the risk profile of institutions holding covered 
bonds, the ECB had to take measures. On the 7 May 2009, the Governing Council announced 
that it would directly purchase 60 billion euros of euro-denominated covered bonds (with a 
minimum rating of AA or equivalent). The technical details of this first CBPP were publicized 
in June. Since the Eurozone had not recovered from the sovereign crisis at that time, on the 6 
October 2011, the ECB announced that it would purchase 40 billion euros of euro-denominated 
covered bonds. The technical details of that measure were declared during the following month. 







Securities Market Program (SMP)   
 
Given the existence of severe malfunctions and liquidity shortages in some market segments, 
the ECB decided to purchase Euro-area marketable-debt instruments issued by central 
governments or public entities from distressed countries, with the objective of lowering the 
yields on sovereign bonds. On the 10 of May 2010, the Governing Council announced the first 
round of the program, which was only focused on Greek, Irish and Portuguese securities. Later, 
during August 2011, the ECB extended the program to include Italian and Spanish debt. 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)  
Created to replace the aforementioned SMP program, the Outright Monetary Transactions 
program aims at diminishing the increases in tensions on sovereign bond markets. The program 
consists of purchasing government bonds with maturities of 1 to 3 years, provided that the 
country agrees to adopt specific economic measures. Thus, this program is meant for countries 
subject to the European Stability Mechanism Program. The official statement was that the OMT 
program was “aimed at safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the 
singleness of the monetary policy.” (European Central Bank, 2012). 
The OMT program was announced in August 2012, with its details being published during 
September. However, the official announcement of the OMT was preceded by an important 
declaration by the President of the ECB, by the end of July 2012, which stated that “Within our 
mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will 
be enough.” (Rivolta, 2014).  
Targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs)  
In order to further incentivize bank lending to the real economy, the ECB introduced the 
targeted longer-term refinancing operations. TLTROs are operations that provide financing to 
credit institutions for periods of up to four years.  
11 
 
On the 5 June 2014, the Governing Council announced the first series of TLTROs. After that, 
other series have been announced. During March 2016, the ECB announced the so-called 
TLTRO II, in which the interest rate to be applied depended on the participating banks’ lending 
patterns. “The more loans that participating banks issue to non-financial corporations and 
households (except loans to households for house purchases), the more attractive the interest 
rate on their TLTRO II borrowings becomes.” (European Central Bank, 2017).  
Asset Purchase Program (APP) 
The Asset Purchase Program includes the purchase of private and public-sector securities, in 
order to address the risks of an excessively prolonged period of low inflation. This program 
expands the purchases of covered bonds and asset-backed securities, by including the so-
called Public Sector securities, issued by central governments, agencies and European 
Institutions.  
On the 22 January 2015, the ECB announced combined monthly purchases in public and private 
sector securities of 60 billion euros. Later, on the 3 December 2015, the Central Bank extended 
the program until March 2017. On the 10 March 2016, the Governing Council announced the 
decision to increase the monthly purchases to 80 billion euros.  
2.4 Comparison of the Unconventional Monetary Policy of the ECB, Fed and the Bank of 
England 
In order to respond to the financial crisis, the ECB, Fed and the Bank of England had to resort 
to unconventional measures that possessed some similarities. In simple terms, besides reducing 
the key interest rates, the central banks expanded existing facilities, provided liquidity to key 
credit markets and financial institutions, conducted asset purchases and resorted to forward 
guidance (Tuckwell & Mendonça, 2016). 
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Notwithstanding, there are considerable differences in the non-standard measures adopted by 
these banks. Firstly, it is relevant to contemplate that the ECB was trying to solve a sovereign 
debt crisis, while its American and English counterparties were facing a subprime banking 
crisis. Due to this, the ECB had to respond later than the other two central banks (Cour-Thimann 
& Winkler, 2013). Moreover, while the Federal Reserve worked on the American market-
system and was oriented on non-banking credit markets and on operations involving private 
sector securities, the ECB was focused mainly on providing liquidity to banks. The Bank of 
England adopted mainly purchases of government bonds (Hálová, 2015). 
Lastly, decision making is much more complex at the ECB. The European Central Bank has to 
deal with different Treasuries’ sovereign debts and fiscal policies. Moreover, while the FED 
has two objectives, price stability and employment, the ECB only targets the latter, which limits 
the use of some unconventional tools.  
In terms of results, the differences are clear. Besides being more timid at reducing interest rates, 
the ECB only later adopted serious quantitative easing measures. Therefore, especially in 
comparison to the Fed, the European Central Bank took more time to increase, in a considerable 
manner, its total assets’ value, as it is seen in Figure 1 of the appendices. 
3. Literature Review 
Historically, both researchers and analysts have examined the effects of changes in monetary 
policy on stock markets. When considering the dividend discount model for equity valuation, 
it is possible to ascertain that there are two ways through which equity prices are affected by 
monetary policy. Firstly, monetary policy has a clear impact on interest rates, which 
consequently leads to changes in the discount rate for future cash flows. Secondly, as monetary 
policy can affect the short to medium term output, it may impact the expected cash flows 
themselves (Kontonikas & Kostakis, 2013). Furthermore, monetary policy influences the way 
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market agents perceive future economic conditions, thereby impacting their asset allocation 
decisions via the expectations channel (Falagiarda & Reitz, 2015).  
This section reviews previous literature regarding the effects of conventional and 
unconventional monetary policy on equities and other assets. Moreover, there is a revision of 
the event study approach.  
3.1 Previous literature on the effect of conventional monetary policy 
The fundamentals in the study of the effects of monetary policy were brought by papers on the 
impact of standard policies, namely the effects of interest rate movements. However, as the 
efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1965) predicts, stock prices only react to unexpected 
changes in monetary policy (Pearce & Roley, 1983). Both these authors also concluded that an 
unanticipated increase in the announced money supply depresses stock prices, while an 
unanticipated decrease elevates stock prices. Years later, Krueger & Kuttner (1996) concluded 
that month-to-month changes in the Federal funds rate are predictable, and the Fed funds futures 
market is very good at anticipating these changes. Thus, studies such as the ones of Bernanke 
& Kuttner (2015) started using a measure of monetary policy based on futures data, which 
clearly isolates the unanticipated element of policy actions. With this methodology, the authors 
reached similar conclusions: unexpected interest rate cuts lead to increases in stock prices. 
Later, other authors found that monetary policy actions in bear markets have a larger effect on 
stocks (Basistha & Kurov (2008); Laopodis (2010)).  
Despite most literature focuses on the United States, several studies also examine the effects of 
unexpected ECB interest rate changes. Angeloni and Ehrmann (2003), Bohl et al. (2008), 
Hussain (2011) and Hayo & Niehof (2011) found evidence of an asymmetric stock market 
reaction to interest rate movements. In other words, European stock markets react negatively 
(positively), and significantly after an unanticipated raise (cut) of the interest rate directly 
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influenced by the ECB. Nonetheless, Fiordelisi et al. (2014) found that interest rate cuts did not 
produce a statistically significant effect on the stock markets between 2007 and 2012. During 
this period, the European interest rates reached the zero-lower bound and the ECB had to resort 
to unconventional measures. In analysing the effects of European interest rate changes, there 
were studies that came up with different methodologies so as to examine ECB’s unexpected 
decisions. For instance, Filbien & Fabien (2011) defined unexpected movements by reviewing 
the consensus in specialized press throughout the days before the announcements. 
Other previous literature also focuses on the effect of unexpected policy changes in different 
industries.  In the United States, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) and Bernanke & Kuttner 
(2005) found that cyclical sectors, such as technology, communications and consumer goods, 
react two to three times more to monetary policy than less cyclical sectors, such as energy and 
utilities. Nevertheless, this pattern may be different during a crisis (Kontonikas & Kostakis., 
2013). In the case of the European market, Angeloni and Ehrmann (2003) and Kholodilin et al. 
(2009) found that equity prices of telecommunications, consumer goods, technology and 
financial companies seem the most sensitive to policy surprises, in an asymmetric way. 
3.2 Previous literature on the effect of unconventional monetary policy 
Apart from the effects of conventional monetary policy, many authors have been paying 
attention to the effects of non-standard policies, due to its recent extensive application by 
international central banks. 
Swanson (2011) conducted a modern event study analysis of the 1960’s Operation Twist and 
found that the program had a highly statistically significant impact on longer-term Treasury 
yields. More recently, Chodorow-Reich (2014) found that the introduction of Fed 
unconventional monetary policy in the winter of 2008–09 had a strong, beneficial impact on 
banks and, especially, on life insurance companies. In the same year, Rogers et. al (2014) found 
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that unconventional policies were effective in easing financial conditions when policy rates 
were stuck at the zero-lower bound, apparently by reducing term premia. In addition, the 
expansionary unconventional policies significantly raised stock prices in the US and in the 
Eurozone, but not in the UK or Japan. 
In line with what happens in the study of the effects of conventional monetary policies, authors 
also apply different techniques to measure unexpected unconventional policies. In most 
procedures, researchers measure policy surprises by examining changes in asset prices. In their 
paper, Hosono and Isobe (2014) used the changes in daily prices of 10-year German 
government bond futures in order to measure European unconventional policy surprises. 
Nevertheless, as several unconventional measures applied by the ECB, during the crisis, 
targeted the lowering of sovereign spreads in peripheral countries, it might not make sense to 
measure monetary surprises using only German yields. In this sense, Rogers et al. (2014) used 
the yield spread between German and Italian 10-year government bonds at the day of an ECB 
announcement in order to measure unconventional monetary surprises. 
At first, most studies related to the impact of ECB’s non-standard policies focused on the effects 
on Government bond yields. During a premature phase of the introduction of these measures, 
Schaeck & Cihak (2009) found evidence that the lengthening of the maturity of monetary policy 
operations and the provision of funds at the fixed rate had some beneficial effects on 
government bond term spreads.  Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) conducted an event study to 
estimate the effects of the SMP, OMT and LTRO programs on yields of distressed sovereign 
bonds in the Eurozone, and found dramatic decreases in yields for all countries around SMP 
and OMT announcement dates. For the LTRO program, the authors found no significant effect 
for peripheral countries. In a similar manner, Falagiarda & Reitz (2015) concluded that ECB 
unconventional policies’ announcements substantially reduced long-term government yields of 
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the GIIPS countries, except for Greece. Furthermore, the authors also concluded that ECB news 
have not been subject to anticipation nor delayed effects. 
Nonetheless, more recently, some authors have analysed the effects of ECB’s unconventional 
policies on stock markets. Fratzscher et al. (2014) reported similar findings to the ones of 
Rogers et al. (2014), and stated that liquidity injections via Supplementary LTROs, the OMT 
and the SMP positively affected equity prices (both broad and banking equity indices) in the 
“core” and the “periphery” of the Eurozone. Particularly, the OMT and the SMP programs had 
positive spillovers to equity prices, worldwide. Haitsma et al. (2015) reached the conclusion 
that unconventional monetary policy surprises had stronger effects on the EURO STOXX 50 
index than standard policy surprises. However, not all authors reported positive effects of 
unconventional policies in the euro area. For instance, Hosono & Isobe (2014) concluded that 
European stock markets reacted negatively to ECB’s unconventional policies, arguing that 
expansionary policies during a crisis might signalize that economic conditions are worse than 
market agents realized.  
Regarding the impact of ECB’s non-standard measures on European industries, most authors 
have analysed its effects on banks, given their financing importance in the euro area. On a paper 
focused on the effects of the OMT program, Acharya et. al (2015) reported that the OMT 
announcement  indirectly recapitalized  periphery  countries’  banks  by  increasing  the  value  
of  their  sovereign bonds. Ricci (2015) arrived to results that suggested that banks were more 
sensitive to nonconventional measures than to interest rate decisions. In a more general study, 
Haitsma et al (2015) also found that the banking sector benefited the most from unconventional 
policies’ announcements, followed by the insurance and oil & gas sectors. Moreover, 
unconventional measures had more positive effects on industries producing durable goods than 
on non-durable sectors.  
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3.3 The Event study applications and criticisms  
There are several methodologies that can be used in order to study the effects of unconventional 
monetary policies. Some studies analyse the impact of monetary policy on stock markets using 
vector autoregressive models (Mojon & Peersman, 2001; Angeloni et al., 2003; Laopodis, 
2010; Cihak et al., 2009; Kontonikas & Kostakis, 2013) or GARCH models (Aijo et al., 2006). 
Nonetheless, most research applies the event study methodology, which was introduced by 
Fama et al (1969). Nowadays, event-studies are conducted in order to determine whether a 
particular event in the capital market or in the life of a company had an impact on a company’s 
stock performance. 
Nevertheless, there are different ways to conduct event-studies in this line of research. While 
studying the impact of Quantitative Easing announcements in the US, Chodorow-Reich (2014) 
uses a cross-sectional approach, regressing event window return of companies on a constant. 
Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) criticized this methodology, stating that it rested on the assumption 
that the common component was entirely caused by the event. In fact, most event studies take 
into account periods outside the event window and compare them with the event period. 
Researchers calculate normal and abnormal returns to identify event specific effects on assets. 
Nevertheless, when the event is the same for different securities, one has total clustering of 
observations. When this happens, papers such as the ones of Binder (1985) or MacKinlay 
(1997) suggest the use of a multivariate regression model, which uses dummy variables for 
events. In this line of procedure, Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) and Ricci (2015) applied models 
with dummies that take the value of one on the days of the monetary announcements.  
Henderson (1989) or Brown & Warner (1985) found that there is no significant difference 
between event study models’ results: even the simplest versions of the event study design work. 
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Campbell et al. (1997) explains that this is because of the fact that the variance of abnormal 
returns is not much reduced by the choice of a more sophisticated model.  
Nonetheless, there are criticisms regarding the event study approach. The disapprovals are 
based on the fact that related papers assume that the surprise part of the announcements or the 
monetary policy shocks are captured by some ad hoc window size around the chosen event. 
Rigobon & Sack (2004) state that if this assumption does not hold, the method is proven to be 
biased. If the window is too narrow, it may miss part of the effects of the announcement. If it is 
too wide, it may contaminate the monetary surprise with other news. Bearing this in mind, Bohl 
et al. (2008) and Rogers et al. (2014) used the heteroscedasticity-based method of Rigobon & 
Sack in their papers. Within this technique, the response of asset prices to changes in monetary 
policy can be identified based on the increase in the variance of policy shocks that occurs on 
announcement days. This identification approach requires a much weaker set of assumptions 
than needed under the event study approach (Rigobon & Sack, 2004).  
Later, Rosa (2011) found that the event study estimates contain a significant bias. However, the 
same author argued that this bias is fairly small and that the OLS approach tends to outperform, 
in an expected squared error sense, the heteroscedasticity-based estimator, for both small and 
large sample sizes. Hence, in general, the event study methodology should be preferred. 
4. Research Hypothesis  
Given the recent literature on the effects of unconventional monetary policies in the Eurozone, 
this paper tests 3 hypothesis regarding the impact of the aforementioned policies in the 




Hypothesis 1: unconventional monetary policies’ announcements have significant impacts on 
European stock markets. 
Hypothesis 2: the announcements have different effects on the various countries and industries’ 
stock indices. 
Hypothesis 3: stock prices adjust to the announcement of unconventional policies during the 
event day. 
In order to test the research hypotheses, an event study based on three different models will be 
conducted. The next section refers to a description of the data and methodology.  
5. Data and Methodology 
5.1 Data 
In order to conduct this paper, daily price data for European domestic and industry stock indices 
were considered. At a national level, twelve countries, belonging to the euro area, were chosen, 
as it can be seen in Table 1 of the appendixes. Although Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, 
Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia also belong to the Eurozone, these nations were excluded from 
the report due to their late entrance. At an industry level, the nineteen “supersectors” were used, 
as defined by the International Classification Benchmark and as is shown in Table 2 of the 
appendixes. All companies belonging to these nineteen indices are from the euro area countries, 
as well. Additionally, the MSCI EMU index was used as a broad-based market index1. 
Furthermore, German and Italian 10-year Government bond yields were used, in order to 
measure unexpected unconventional policies. All of the aforementioned data was extracted 
                                                          
1 The MSCI MEU index is a Morgan Stanley Capital Internatinal (MSCI) free float-adjusted market 




from Bloomberg, except for the MSCI EMU index returns, which were retrieved from 
Datastream. 
The continuously compounded returns were calculated as: 𝑟𝑖𝑡 = ln⁡(
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
). In this equation, the 
numerator is the stock closing price at the end of day t, and the denominator is the stock closing 
price at the end of the previous day (t-1). 
Tables 1 and 2 of the appendices display the descriptive statistics of national and industry stock 
market indices, at a time period starting on the 3 January 2007 and ending on the 31 December 
2016. During this period, the euro area faced an economic crisis that had serious consequences 
for equity markets. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that most of the domestic stock indices 
had negative mean daily returns. While the German stock index had the largest mean daily 
returns, the Greek and Portuguese indices performed the worse, on average. Greece and Italy 
displayed the most volatile returns, as it can be seen by their standard deviation. The economic 
crisis had its strongest effects on the banking industry, which, consequently, had the lowest 
mean daily returns. Contrarily, non-durable sectors are among the best performers, as it can be 
seen for Personal & Household goods, Chemicals and Food & Beverages industries. The 
Automobile & Parts and the Banking indices were the most volatile. As it was predicted, due 
to the inherent characteristics of daily stock returns, the results of skewness-kurtosis tests 
indicate a strong degree of non-normality.  
Defining the date in which the market first learns of the new information is a crucial task in 
every event study. Omitting potentially relevant event dates not only reduces the power of the 
test, but can also introduce downward and upward biases. In this paper, previous event studies 
of the effects of ECB unconventional monetary policy were looked up, in order to set the event 
dates. Specifically, the works of Kilponen et al. (2012), Rogers et al. (2014), Pereira (2016), 
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Ambler & Rumler (2016), Galariotis et al. (2017) and Jager & Grigoriadis (2017) were 
examined. After a detailed analysis of the events’ importance, as it is described in the above-
mentioned papers, a group of announcements that were part of six main ECB unconventional 
programs were chosen. Table 3 of the appendixes describes them in detail.  
5.2 Methodology 
Traditionally, event-studies share common phases. First, investigators define the date upon 
which the market received the news. After that, they characterize the returns of the individual 
companies in the absence of this news (normal returns) and measure the difference between 
observed returns and “no-news” returns for each firm (abnormal returns) during the event 
window. After aggregating abnormal returns across firms and time, they statistically test their 
significance (Henderson, 1990).  
However, when the event is the same for different securities, one has total clustering of 
observations. In other words, the residuals will not be independent if the event occurs during 
the same calendar time period for some firms. When this happens, papers such as the ones of 
Binder (1985) or MacKinlay (1997) suggest the use of a multivariate regression model, which 
uses dummy variables for events. Given that the events naturally occur at the same time for 
each domestic and industry stock indices, I follow the approach suggested by Krishnamurthy 
& al. (2014) and Ambler & Rumler (2016) and use a time-series dummy variable regression, in 
order to study the effects of unconventional monetary policy announcements on the European 
stock markets. The equation, which is applied to each stock index returns from 2007 to 2016, 
using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method, is the following: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖1𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖2𝐶𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖3𝑆𝑀𝑃𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖4𝑂𝑀𝑇𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖5𝑇𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖6𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1) 
22 
 
In this model, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 represents the returns on day t of a certain stock index i, 𝛼𝑖 is the constant, 𝛽𝑖 
is the variable that measures the influence of market returns (𝑅𝑚𝑡) and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term on 
day t. Most importantly, the regression includes dummy variables for each of the six analysed 
ECB unconventional programs, with the various announcements divided between them. Since 
the event window includes just the day of the announcement, the dummy variables take the 
value of 1, on the event day, and 0, if not. Although other studies use models with dummy 
variables for single announcements, I decided not to do so, as using singleton dummies – 
dummy variables with only one observation – is not only computationally inefficient, but also 
overstates the statistical significance of the regression coefficients and might lead to incorrect 
inference (Correia, 2015). 
Due to the characteristics of daily data, there might be some problems with the OLS time series 
approach. While non-normality of daily returns is not relevant for significance tests, in event 
study methodologies (Brown and Warner, 1985), the presence of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation leads OLS to no longer be the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE). 
Therefore, I conducted some formal tests in order to detect these characteristics in the model, 
beginning by conducting both White and Breusch-Pagan tests for heteroscedasticity using the 
Stata software. As it can be seen in Figure 3 of the appendices, for the French index returns, the 
null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is clearly rejected. Afterwards, I analyse the 
autocorrelation function plot for the dependent variable. As it can be seen in Figure 4 of the 
appendices, the null of no autocorrelation with 5 lags is clearly rejected. Since I obtained similar 
test results using Stata for the other stock returns, from both national and industry indices, I 
assume the model to suffer from heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of 5 lags. Consequently, 
in order to adjust the covariance matrix for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, I decided to 
follow the methodology applied by Ioannidis & Kontonikas (2008) and use Newey-West 
standard errors with 5 lags. This methodology is not only used in all of this paper’s regressions, 
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but is also applied to panel data analysis of the effects of ECB’s unconventional policies on 
groups of countries, such as the GIIPS.  
When considering the characteristics of the announcements under study, it may be concluded 
that many of them were extensions or changes in the conditions of some programs. As a result, 
I believe that some of those events were not meaningful for the European equity markets, hence 
being negligible for the common investor. For the purpose of finding the announcements that 
were significant enough to affect the stock markets, I follow the approach of Galariotis et al. 
(2017) and specify which of these ECB announcements were covered by Financial Times’ 
headline articles, as it is shown in Table 3 of the appendices. Moreover, I use the following 
equation in order to study the effects of these important events: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖1𝐼𝑀𝑃_𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(2) 
The independent variable 𝐼𝑀𝑃_𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑡 is a dummy that takes the value of 1, on the days of 
“Important Announcements”2. While the event that happened on the 8 August 2011 was 
covered by a Financial Times’ headline article, I decided not to include it on the group of 
“Important Announcements”, since, US and global stock markets crashed after Standard & 
Poors downgraded US sovereign debt from an AAA credit rating to AA+ on the previous Friday 
Night (Financial Times , 2011). Given the magnitude of this happening, I am sure that it 
contaminated the effects of the ECB announcement, and thus it is not possible to accurately 
examine its effects on European stocks. 
Following Falagiarda & Reitz (2015), I also decided to look for anticipation and delayed effects. 
Therefore, using regression (2), I include a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 during 
                                                          
2 The “Important Announcements” group includes the following dates: 22/08/2007; 07/05/2009; 10/05/2010; 
06/10/2011; 26/07/2012; 06/09/2012; 05/06/2014; 04/09/2014; 22/01/2015 and 10/03/2016 
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the event day and the previous one, and another dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 
during the event day and the following one.  
The previously presented regressions do not incorporate a measure of the unexpected part of 
the ECB announcements. In the light of this fact, I decided to conduct another regression, which 
follows the methodology of Rogers et al. (2014) and Haitsma et al. (2016). These authors used 
the yield spread between German and Italian 10-year government bonds at the day of an ECB 
announcement, in order to measure unconventional monetary surprises. The surprise factor can 







In this model, 𝑦𝑠,𝑡
𝐼 ⁡and 𝑦𝑠,𝑡
𝐺 ⁡are the Italian and German 10-year government bond yields at day t 
respectively. 
Consequently, the following equation measures the effects on European stock markets of the 
change in spread between German and Italian 10-year bond yields during the days of “Important 
Announcements”: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖1∆𝑟𝑡
𝑢,𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(3) 
6. Results 
During this section, I will present the results obtained for the various models, for both national 
and sectorial indices. The interpretation of these results will confirm or negate my hypotheses.  
6.1 Country results 
Table 4 of the appendices shows the results for equation (1), when applied for the different 




In terms of the effects of the LTRO program, the panel-data results display an insignificant 
impact for all indices, except for the German one. The LTROs were designed to improve banks’ 
liquidity positions, further reducing term spreads in the money market, while encouraging 
banks to maintain and increase their provision of credit to the real economy (European Central 
Bank , 2012). However, Daetz et al. (2016) concluded that the excess liquidity generated by 
means of this operation apparently was absorbed by the deposit facility on a daily basis. Hence, 
this measure was not enough to boost corporate investments. Given these findings, it can be 
suggested that this program was also inefficient at boosting investors’ confidence, and stock 
prices as a result. Nonetheless, regarding the results for the German index, these suggest that 
German equities did not react well to the first news that indicated that the ECB had to take 
serious initiatives in order to attenuate the effects of the European Crisis.  
The results for the CBBP program also indicate that these measures mostly had an insignificant 
influence on the European stock markets. This program targeted the rehabilitation of the private 
debt security markets, and thus it might not have caused significant effects on equities.  
The results for the SMP announcements indicate significant effects on European stock markets, 
for both the northern and peripheral countries. However, the signs are different for both groups. 
On one hand, for the IPS group, an SMP announcement produces an increase of almost 2% in 
abnormal returns. On the other, for the northern countries, an SMP announcement causes a 
decrease of 1% in abnormal returns. These conclusions are in accordance with the findings of 
Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) who find strong stock price reactions for the SMP program. These 
authors also found that the SMP worked mainly through a reduction in default and 
redenomination risk, which positively affected investors’ confidence in the peripheral 
countries. Contrarily, for the northern countries, the SMP measures create moral hazard 
problems, since these countries would have to bailout the southern economies. Moreover, these 
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policies diminished the need for fiscal discipline in the European periphery and could lead to 
rising inflation levels in the northern nations. 
Table 4 of the appendices displays mostly insignificant coefficients for the OMT program. 
According to Krishnamurhty et al. (2014), the OMT program had similar results to the SMP, 
also working mainly through a reduction in default and redenomination risk. However, the 
insignificant impacts on stock markets might be explained by some particular reasons. While 
on one hand, the OMT is “intended to prevent market panic from pushing otherwise solvent 
governments into bad equilibria”, on the other the program conditionally “requires more 
austerity” (The Bruegel Newsletter, 2014). These two consequences, which theoretically would 
cause contrasting effects, might have cancelled the effects of one another.  
The results of Table 4 of the appendices suggests that the TLTRO program had an insignificant 
impact on European stock indices. The TLTRO program was created to eliminate the flaws of 
regular LTROs. Since the permitted additional borrowing amounts would be linked to the 
banks’ lending to the non-financial sector, TLTROS were more directed towards their final goal 
of overcoming the financing difficulties at the corporate and household levels (Daetz et al., 
2016). However, some investigators concluded that “the program had not managed to put us 
back to a high growth path of lending to the real economy” (The Bruegel Newsletter, 2016). 
Additionally, it was also appointed that markets were sceptic towards the effectiveness of the 
measures announced (Seeking Alpha, 2016), which might explain the negative signs of the 
(insignificant) coefficients. 
In relation to the APP program, the results suggest significant effects on the stock markets. The 
signs of the coefficients indicate that the program benefited the GIIPS countries’ indices, but 
harmed some of the northern ones. The APP is considered the ECB experience with 
Quantitative Easing. As it is shown on figure 1 of the appendices, these measures significantly 
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raised the European Central Bank’s assets. For periphery countries, the program proved that the 
ECB was ready to do “whatever it takes” to save the Euro area, which clearly improved 
confidence. For the northern countries, such as Germany, the APP announcements indicated 
that these more robust economies would have to step-in in order to “bailout for free-spending 
governments such as Greece” (The Guardian, 2015). 
Besides looking at the programs at an individual level, it is fundamental to evaluate the impacts 
of the overall unconventional announcements, taking into account the events that were more 
meaningful for investors. In order to do so, we analyse the results for the second regression, 
which takes into account the “Important Announcements”.  
As can be seen in Table 5 of the appendices, the results for equation (2) indicate statistically 
significant and positive abnormal returns for the Italian, Portuguese and Spanish indices.  For 
the IPS group, an important ECB unconventional announcement causes on average a close to 
1% increase in abnormal stock returns. However, the contrary happens for the German case. 
The ECB non-standard measures could lead to inflation pressures for Germany, besides 
indicating that this country would have to “step-in” and share the risk with the ECB, in order 
to attenuate the effects of the European crisis on the less fiscally prudent countries of the Euro 
system.  The statistically non-significant coefficient for Greece confirms the idea that the Greek 
financial crisis developed in an independent way from the rest of Europe (Gonzalez-Hermosillo 
& Johnson, 2014). In terms of the Irish index, it might have reacted in a negative way to ECB’s 
non-standard measures since the country introduced austerity measures first than the other 
GIIPS, and “also benefited with the recovery of its two biggest export markets, Britain and 
United States. A weaker euro also helped” (Foreign Policy, 2016). 
Additionally, the results displayed in Table 5 of the appendices indicate that there were no 
anticipation nor delayed effect, which is in accordance with Falagiarda & Reitz (2015).  
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Finally, as seen in Table 6 of the appendices, the results for equation (3) show evidence of a 
highly significant negative influence of the unconventional monetary policy surprise for the IPS 
countries. An unconventional monetary policy announcement that causes a decrease in the 
German-Italian yield spread of 0,18% points (the average change on event days) produces on 
average an increase of 0,6% in the abnormal stock returns of the IPS countries. Unsurprisingly, 
the coefficients’ values have positive signs for most northern countries’ indices. For these, a 
decrease in the German-Italian yield spread is related to a decrease in abnormal returns. The 
results are qualitatively in accordance with the findings of Haitsma et al. (2015) and Rogers et 
al. (2014).  
6.2 Industry results 
Table 7 of the appendices shows the results for equation (1) applied to industry stock returns. 
The analyses of the programs’ impacts shows mostly negligent effects for the LTRO, CBPP 
and TLTRO dummies. In relation to the SMP program, it seems that it highly benefited banks’ 
stock returns. Other positive effects are found for the Insurance and Telecommunications sector. 
Contrarily, the SMP mostly provoked negative effects on the stock returns of non-durable 
industries, such as the Basic Resources and Chemicals. As for the case of the OMT, the results 
are difficult to interpret, given the heterogeneity of the relationships between the coefficient 
signals and the sectors’ characteristics. Lastly, the APP program results provide evidence for 
positive effects on the banking stocks (albeit at the 10% level). Nevertheless, for the same 
program, we can find evidence for negative and positive impact on different durable and non-
durable industries, which prejudices the making of inferences for the impacts of the APP. 
Given the previous conclusions, it might be better to focus on the results of equation (2), which 
are found on Table 8 of the appendices. For this model, the results suggest that ECB’s 
unconventional monetary policies had significant and positive effects on the banking sector. On 
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average, an unconventional monetary policy announcement leads to a 1% increase in abnormal 
stock returns for European banks. It is unsurprising to see that this is the sector that benefited 
the most from ECB’s unconventional policies’ announcements. On one side, these measures 
significantly reduced bank risk and allowed banks to access market based financing again. On 
another, ECB non-standard policies substantially reduced the yields on periphery sovereign 
debt, which directly effects financial companies’ balance sheets. After Banks, the Real Estate, 
Insurance and Telecommunications sectors also show positive and significant coefficients, at a 
10% level. The first benefited with the improved credit conditions at a corporate and household 
level. The second benefited from the rising value of legacy assets (Chodorow-Reich, 2014). In 
contrast non-durable sectors, like Chemicals, Technology or Personal & Household goods, 
which are less dependent on economic and financing conditions, from a customer demand 
perspective, have negative coefficients, meaning that ECB’s unconventional polices are related 
with negative abnormal returns. These results are qualitatively in line with the findings of 
previous authors, such as Haitsma et al. (2015).  
In terms of anticipation and delayed effects, the results provide no evidence of their existence.  
Moreover, the results for equation (3), found on Table 9 of the appendices, which takes into 
account the measure of unconventional policy surprises, confirm that the ECB non-standard 
announcements were advantageous for the banking sector’s stocks. An unconventional 
monetary policy announcement that causes a decrease in the German-Italian yield spread of 
0,18% points (the average change on event days) produces on average an increase in the 
abnormal returns of European banks’ of more than 1%. Additionally, it seems that the Insurance 
and the Telecommunications sectors’ stocks were also benefited by non-standard monetary 
policies. Regarding the Telecommunications sector, these results can be explained by the high 
external finance dependence of this industry, which consequently benefits from better credit 
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conditions. Lastly, the coefficients for most non-durable sectors indicate that stock returns react 
symmetrically to decreases in the German-Italian Government bond yield spread. 
As a conclusion, I would like to point out that this paper’s results agree with the three 
hypotheses that were previously outlined. 
7. Conclusion 
The main objective of this paper was to study the effects of the ECB’s unconventional policies 
on European stock returns, since most of the previous research had focused on the impact on 
other assets, especially on Government bonds. 
Through a methodology that is built on the approach of previous authors, I conducted an event 
study that provides evidence for the existence of statistically significant impacts of 
unconventional policy on the stocks of both countries and industries’ stock indices. My event 
study combines the results of three different models. First, I start by following the approach 
used by Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) and use a time-series dummy variable regression that 
includes dummies for six ECB unconventional programs (LTRO, CBPP, SMP, OMT, TLTRO 
and APP). Since the econometric tests indicate the presence of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation, I adjust my model with the use of a Newey-West estimation of standard errors, 
as it was suggested by Ioannidis & Kontonikas (2008).  
An examination of the nature of the announcements suggests that some were not considered 
important news for investors. Therefore, in order to specify which ones had enough magnitude 
to change investors’ confidence, I follow the approach of Galariotis et al. (2017) and identify 
which of these ECB announcements were covered by Financial Times’ headline articles. After 
that, I specify a time-series regression that only takes into account those events. 
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My methodology ends with the study of the relationship between stock returns and changes in 
the yield spread between German and Italian 10-year government bonds during announcement 
dates. This approach was firstly suggested by Rogers et al. (2014). 
At a country level, the results suggest that the SMP and APP programs had a significant 
influence on the stock markets of various European nations. First, the SMP announcements led 
to positive abnormal returns in the IPS group’s indices, but negative abnormal returns for the 
northern countries. Second, the APP program benefited the GIIPS countries’ indices, but 
harmed some of the northern ones, such as the German. Regarding the other four programs, the 
results do not provide evidence for significant impact on abnormal stock returns of European 
indices.  
If we consider the effects of the announcements covered by Financial Times’ headline articles, 
the results indicate that ECB unconventional policies benefited the peripheral European stock 
markets, namely Italy, Spain and Portugal. This is in line with the effects of unconventional 
measures on government bonds’ yields for these countries, as observed in previous papers. 
Stock market effects are negative for Germany, though. For this country, the ECB non-standard 
measures might lead to raising inflation levels, and also create moral hazard problems, since 
Germany would have to “bailout” the peripheral economies, which had followed fiscally 
imprudent policies.  
In relation to the results of the third model, these suggest the existence of a significant and 
negative relationship between abnormal stock returns and changes in the yield spread between 
German and Italian bonds for the IPS nations. The contrary happens for countries such as 
Germany and Finland.  
In terms of the effects across industries, the study finds mostly insignificant effects for the 
LTRO, CBPP, OMT and TLTRO programs. Moreover, the results provide statistical evidence 
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of positive impacts of the SMP and APP programs on banking stocks, albeit the latter at the 
10% level.  
If we consider only the “Important Announcements”, results are easier to interpret. As it was 
expected, the banking sector benefited the most with the ECB’s unconventional polices, 
followed by the Real Estate, Telecommunications and Insurance sectors. In contrast, the 
coefficient results are negative for the case of non-durable sectors, like Chemicals, Technology 
or Personal & Household goods. The results for equation 3 are in accordance with the previous 
findings.  
Finally, it is important to describe how future related research can proceed. First, investigators 
could focus on describing the reasons for some events being more important than others. An 
analysis of the event collection of previous literature shows no consensus in this matter. Second, 
besides the event study approach, other methodologies such as the identification through the 
heteroscedasticity-based approach of Rigobon & Sack (2004) could be applied. Third, 
investigators could study the effects of unconventional policies on companies based on their 
different characteristics, such as size, cash levels or financial leverage. Forth, it could be studied 
the effects of ECB’s unconventional policies on stock indices that do not incorporate financial 
companies. Finally, other works could focus on studying the prolonged effects of 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of industries’ daily stock market data 
                                                          
3 This refers to a Skewness Kurtosis test for normality, which is similar to a Jarque Bera test of normality. It 
shows probability<chi2  
  
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Normality (Sk/Kur)3 
Austria -0,02% 1,72% 10,25% 12,02% 0,00 
Belgium -0,00% 1,34% -8,32% 9,22% 0,00 
Finland -0,00% 1,479% -8,160% 8,850% 0,00 
France -0,01% 1,527% -9,472% 10,595% 0,00 
Germany 0,02% 1,470% -7,430% 10,800% 0,00 
Greece -0,08% 2,240% 17,713% 13,431% 0,00 
Ireland -0,02% 1,621% 13,964% 9,733% 0,00 
Italy -0,03% 1,754% 13,331% 10,874% 0,00 
Luxembourg -0,01% 1,450% 11,159% 9,104% 0,00 
Netherlands -0,00% 1,431% -9,590% 10,028% 0,00 
Portugal -0,03% 1,387% 10,379% 10,196% 0,00 









Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Normality (Sk/Kur) 
Automobile & Parts 0,023% 2,366% -35,730% 41,081% 0,00 
Banks -0,052% 2,305% -19,874% 17,763% 0,00 
Basic Resources -0,022% 2,256% -13,889% 15,966% 0,00 
Chemicals 0,027% 1,539% -8,604% 12,555% 0,00 
Construction & Materials -0,003% 1,809% -10,700% 12,376% 0,00 
Financial Services -0,013% 1,608% -10,390% 12,247% 0,00 
Food & Beverages 0,023% 1,194% -6,893% 6,600% 0,00 
Healthcare 0,017% 1,288% -8,715% 9,672% 0,00 
Industrial Goods & Services 0,014% 1,598% -10,360% 11,574% 0,00 
Insurance -0,009% 1,978% -11,134% 13,582% 0,00 
Media -0,003% 1,255% -8,040% 11,342% 0,00 
Oil & Gas -0,012% 1,690% -10,121% 13,084% 0,00 
Personal & Household goods 0,028% 1,392% -7,416% 9,196% 0,00 
Real Estate -0,012% 1,550% -8,635% 8,780% 0,00 
Retail 0,014% 1,327% -8,740% 7,674% 0,00 
Technology 0,011% 1,534% -10,706% 9,652% 0,00 
Travel & Leisure 0,008% 1,468% -9,190% 7,640% 0,00 
Telecommunications -0,013% 1,383% -9,969% 10,471% 0,00 




Table 3: ECB Unconventional Monetary Policy Events 
 
                                                          
4 Sources can be found in the references 
5
 During this day, the ECB also announced two LTROs with 12-month maturity. However, in order to avoid 
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Announcement of the purchase of euro-
denominated covered bonds issued in the euro 
area (CBPP1) 
Yes 
CBPP 04/06/2009 Publication of the technical details of CBPP1 No 
CBPP 06/10/2011 
Announcement of the second Covered Bond 
Purchase Program (CBPP2)5 
Yes 
CBPP 03/11/2011 Publication of the technical details of CBPP2 No 
CBPP 04/09/2014 
Announcement of a new Covered Bond 
Purchase Program (CBPP3) and a new Asset 
Backed Securities Program 
Yes 
SMP 10/05/2010 
Announcement of the Securities Markets 
Program 
Yes 
SMP 08/08/2011 Announcement of the re-launch of the SMP Yes 
OMT 26/07/2012 
Draghi states that the ECB is ready to do 
“whatever it takes” to preserve the euro 
Yes 
OMT 02/08/2012 
Press conference announcing Outright 
Monetary Transactions 
No 





Figure 2: Equation (1) outputs for the French stock index, without robust standard errors 
 
  
                                                          
6 During this day, the ECB also announced a new series of TLTROs. However, in order to avoid multicolinearity 
problems with the programs dummy variables, I decided to include this event date only in the APP group. 
 
TLTRO 05/06/2014 
ECB announces a first series of TLTROs and 
decides to cut the deposit facility rate below 
zero for the first time. 
Yes 
TLTRO 16/09/2014 Announcement of the first TLTROs. No 
TLTRO 09/12/2014 Announcement of the second TLTROs. No 
TLTRO 17/03/2015 Announcement of the third TLTROs. No 
TLTRO 16/06/2015 Announcement of the fourth TLTROs. No 
TLTRO 22/09/2015 Announcement of the fifth TLTROs. No 
TLTRO 09/12/2015 Announcement of the sixth TLTROs. No 
TLTRO 22/03/2016 Announcement of the seventh TLTROs. No 
APP 22/01/2015 
Announcement of a large-scale Asset Purchase 
Program. 
Yes 
APP 03/12/2015 Announcement of an extension of the APP. No 
APP 10/03/2016 
Announcement of a further refinement of the 
APP, which includes the Corporate Sector 
Purchase Program6. 
Yes 
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         APP    -.0013919   .0014658    -0.95   0.342    -.0042661    .0014824
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 IndexReturn        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .596939371     2,559  .000233271   Root MSE        =    .00254
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.9724
    Residual    .016418381     2,552  6.4335e-06   R-squared       =    0.9725
       Model     .58052099         7   .08293157   Prob > F        =    0.0000
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. reg IndexReturn LTRO CBPP SMP OMT TLRO APP MSCIEMU
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Figure 3: The Breusch-Pagan and White tests for heteroscedasticity in equation (1) (French 
stock index example) 
 
 
Figure 4: Autocorrelation plot of squared residuals (French stock index example) 
 
                                                   
               Total       121.77     22    0.0000
                                                   
            Kurtosis         4.03      1    0.0446
            Skewness        12.56      7    0.0836
  Heteroskedasticity       105.17     14    0.0000
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
. estat imtest
. 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0006
         chi2(1)      =    11.68
         Variables: fitted values of IndexReturn
         Ho: Constant variance
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Figure 5: Equation (1) outputs for the French stock index, with Newey-West standard errors 
with 5 lags 
 
Figure 6: Equation (2) outputs for the French stock index, with Newey-West standard errors 
with 5 lags 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0001058   .0000482    -2.19   0.028    -.0002004   -.0000112
     MSCIEMU     1.030666   .0047035   219.13   0.000     1.021443    1.039889
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 IndexReturn        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Newey-West
                                                                              
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0000
maximum lag: 5                                  F(  7,      2552) =    7845.99
Regression with Newey-West standard errors      Number of obs     =      2,560
. newey IndexReturn LTRO CBPP SMP OMT TLRO APP MSCIEMU, lag(5)
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0001107   .0000475    -2.33   0.020    -.0002039   -.0000175
     MSCIEMU     1.030378    .004766   216.19   0.000     1.021032    1.039723
     imp_ann    -.0002329   .0007382    -0.32   0.752    -.0016804    .0012146
                                                                              
 IndexReturn        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Newey-West
                                                                              
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0000
maximum lag: 5                                  F(  2,      2557) =   23606.40
Regression with Newey-West standard errors      Number of obs     =      2,560
. newey IndexReturn imp_ann MSCIEMU, lag(5)
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 IndexReturn        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Newey-West
                                                                              
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0000
maximum lag: 5                                  F(  2,      2557) =   24628.83
Regression with Newey-West standard errors      Number of obs     =      2,560
. newey IndexReturn UNCV_SURP MSCIEMU, lag(5)
Figure 7: Equation (2) outputs for the French stock index, with Newey-West standard errors 
with 5 lags (anticipation effects) 
 
Figure 8: Equation (2) outputs for the French stock index, with Newey-West standard errors 
with 5 lags (delayed effects) 
 
Figure 9: Equation (3) outputs for the French stock index, with Newey-West standard errors 
with 5 lags  
  
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0001112   .0000477    -2.33   0.020    -.0002047   -.0000177
     MSCIEMU     1.030306    .004758   216.54   0.000     1.020976    1.039636
    imp_anna    -.0000507   .0006884    -0.07   0.941    -.0014006    .0012992
                                                                              
 IndexReturn        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Newey-West
                                                                              
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0000
maximum lag: 5                                  F(  2,      2557) =   23522.76
Regression with Newey-West standard errors      Number of obs     =      2,560
. newey IndexReturn imp_anna MSCIEMU, lag(5)
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0001074   .0000477    -2.25   0.024    -.0002009   -.0000139
     MSCIEMU     1.030608   .0047679   216.15   0.000     1.021259    1.039957
    imp_annd    -.0005389   .0004197    -1.28   0.199    -.0013619    .0002842
                                                                              
 IndexReturn        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Newey-West
                                                                              
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0000
maximum lag: 5                                  F(  2,      2557) =   23933.46
Regression with Newey-West standard errors      Number of obs     =      2,560
. newey IndexReturn imp_annd MSCIEMU, lag(5)
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Table 4: Equation (1) outputs for national stock indices 
  
All regressions are estimated with Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags. North includes: Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands. GIIPS includes: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. IPS 
includes: Italy, Portugal and Spain. * Denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level 
and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
  Market Program 
Country/Region MSCI EMU Index LTRO CBPP SMP OMT TLTRO APP 
All Countries 0,8980*** 0,0007 0,0005 -0,0025 -0,0027 -0,0020 0,0048*** 
North 0,9001*** -0,0003 0,0014 -0,0101*** -0,0031 -0,0005 0,0016 
GIIPS 0,8950*** 0,0021 -0,0007 0,0082 -0,0021 -0,0042 0,0094*** 
IPS 0,9562*** 0,0011 0,0027 0,0184*** 0,0015 0,0013 0,0099*** 
Austria 0,9718*** 0,0026 0,0007 -0,0142** -0,0006 -0,0010* 0,0090** 
Belgium 0,8375*** -0,0011 0,0053 0,0030 -0,0022 -0,0012* 0,0020 
Finland 0,8696*** -0,0000 0,0003 -0,0082*** -0,0056 -0,0001 -0,0061*** 
France 1,0306*** -0,0008 0,0006* -0,0057*** -0,0008 -0,0003 -0,0015*** 
Germany 0,9648*** -0,0023** -0,0014 -0,0262*** -0,0031 -0,0018 -0,0051*** 
Greece 0,7692*** 0,0052 -0,0107* -0,0073 -0,0150 -0,0224 0,0152* 
Ireland 0,8324*** 0,0018 -0,0015 -0,0071** 0,0002 -0,0026 0,0021 
Italy 1,1020*** 0,0007 0,0025 0,0122** 0,0008 0,0008 0,0106*** 
Luxembourg 0,7000*** -0,0006 0,0033 -0,0081 -0,0061*** -0,0015 0,0011 
Netherlands 0,9269*** -0,0013 0,0008 -0,0120*** -0,0038 0,0013* -0,0013 
Portugal 0,7412*** 0,0026 0,0061 0,0155 0,0006 0,0014 0,0097*** 
Spain 1,0255** -0,0000 -0,0005 0,0276*** 0,0032 0,0005 0,0093*** 
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All regressions are estimated with Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags. North includes: Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands. GIIPS includes: Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain. IPS includes: Italy, Portugal and Spain. The dummies “IMP_ANN 
anticipation” and “IMP_ANN delayed” incorporate a two-day event window, in order to capture 
anticipation and delayed effects. * Denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 
5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
 Market Program 
Country/Region MSCI EMU Index IMP_ANN IMP_ANN anticipation IMP_ANN delayed 
All Countries 0,8971*** 0,0010 0,0004 0,0008 
North 0,8995*** -0,0010 -0,0003 -0,0005 
GIIPS 0,8937*** 0,0036 0,0015 0,0026* 
IPS 0,9543*** 0,0080*** 0,0043*** 0,0044*** 
Austria 0,9680*** 0,0042 0,0032 0,0013*** 
Belgium 0,8380*** 0,0026 0,0010 0,0008 
Finland 0,8684*** -0,0011 0,0005 0,0010 
France 1,0304*** -0,0003 -0,0002 -0,0005 
Germany 0,9661*** -0,0085*** -0,0039** -0,0037*** 
Greece 0,7670*** -0,0003 -0,0009 0,0019 
Ireland 0,8336*** -0,0053* -0,0038* -0,0016 
Italy 1,1002*** 0,0058*** 0,0036** 0,0045** 
Luxembourg 0,6988*** -0,0010 -0,0001 0,0013 
Netherlands 0,9265*** -0,0021 -0,0019 -0,0020 
Portugal 0,7389*** 0,0085** 0,0049* 0,0048*** 
Spain 1,0238*** 0,0096** 0,0043* 0,0043* 
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 Market Monetary Surprise 
Country/Region MSCI EMU Index Unconventional Surprise 
All Countries 0,8977*** 0,0018 
North 0,9006*** 0,0119 
GIIPS 0,8937*** -0,0105 
IPS 0,9525*** -0,0354*** 
Austria 0,9700*** 0,0018 
Belgium 0,8375*** -0,0066 
Finland 0,8710*** 0,0205*** 
France 1,0310*** 0,0048* 
Germany 0,9690*** 0,0441** 
Greece 0,1869*** -0,0478 
Ireland 0,8348*** 0,0230*** 
Italy 1,100*** -0,0200*** 
Luxembourg 0,6989*** 0,0040 
Netherlands 0,9257*** 0,0169 
Portugal 0,7380*** -0,0303* 
Spain 1,0200*** -0,0559*** 
All regressions are estimated with Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags. North includes: Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands. GIIPS includes: Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain. IPS includes: Italy, Portugal and Spain. The “Unconventional Surprise” 
dummy measures the change in spread between German and Italian 10-year bond yields during the days 
of “Important Announcements”. * Denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 




Table 7: Equation (1) outputs for sector stock indices 




LTRO CBPP SMP OMT TLTRO APP 
Automobile & Parts 1,0235*** 0,0115 -0,0004 -0,0381*** -0,0082 -0,0041 -0,0050 
Banks 1,4005*** 0,0018 0,0019 0,0368*** 0,0047 0,0019 0,0181* 
Basic Resources 1,2931*** -0,0022 0,0053 -0,0334*** -0,0158* 0,0029* 0,0041 
Chemicals 0,9379*** -0,0025 -0,0027 -0,0220*** -0,0008 -0,0020 -0,0086*** 
Construction & Materials 1,1313*** -0,0050 -0,0015 -0,0104*** -0,0045* 0,0022* 0,0019*** 
Financial Services 0,9687*** -0,0026 -0,0033 -0,0111 -0,0143*** -0,0000 0,0055*** 
Food & Beverages 0,6222*** -0,0012 0,0066 -0,0050*** 0,0017 -0,0020* -0,0084** 
Healthcare 0,6604*** 0,0046 0,0022 -0,0156*** 0,0052*** -0,0042* -0,0097 
Industrial Goods & Services 1,0119*** -0,0058 -0,0001 -0,0217*** -0,0061 0,0009 -0,0024 
Insurance 1,2361*** -0,0005 0,0034 0,0095*** -0,0027 0,0039* 0,0042*** 
Media 0,7390*** 0,0049* 0,0003 -0,0096 -0,0044 -0,0016 -0,0016 
Oil & Gas 1,0063*** -0,0001 0,0033 -0,0065 0,0048*** 0,0069* -0,0071* 
Personal & Household Goods 0,8388*** -0,0044 -0,0056*** -0,0138*** 0,0007 -0,0021 -0,0060* 
Real Estate 0,8207*** 0,0034 0,0030 -0,0190** -0,0080*** -0,0009 0,0085 
Retail 0,7561*** 0,0000 0,0013 -0,0067*** 0,0037*** -0,0033*** -0,0082*** 
Technology 0,8830*** -0,0068 -0,0061 -0,02900*** -0,0058 0,0002 0,0043*** 
Telecommunications 0,7903*** 0,0029 -0,0019 0,0076*** -0,0033 -0,0023 0,0021 
Travel & Leisure 0,7815*** -0,0018 -0,0038 -0,0202*** 0,0015 -0,0058*** 0,0025 
Utilities 0,8803*** -0,0056** -0,0014 -0,0110 0,0003 0,0008 0,0149*** 
 
All regressions are estimated with Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags. * Denotes significance at 





Table 8: Equation (2) outputs for sector stock indices 
 
All regressions are estimated with Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags. The dummies “IMP_ANN 
anticipation” and “IMP_ANN delayed” incorporate a two-day event window, in order to capture 
anticipation and delayed effects. * Denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 
5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
  









Automobile & Parts 1,0200*** -0,0047 -0,0003 -0,00047 
Banks 1,3981*** 0,0123*** 0,0073** 0,0077** 
Basic Resources 1,2900*** -0,0035 0,0000 -0,0033 
Chemicals 0,9394*** -0,0071** -0,0029 -0,0035** 
Construction & Materials 1,1304*** -0,00096 -0,0007 -0,0015 
Financial Services 0,9675*** -0,0050 -0,0027 -0,0046** 
Food & Beverages 0,6220*** 0,0041 0,0007 -0,0001 
Healthcare 0,6618*** -0,0040* -0,0022 -0,0026** 
Industrial Goods & Services 1,0124*** -0,0052 -0,0025 -0,0023 
Insurance 1,2363*** 0,0003* 0,0012 0,0005 
Media 0,7381*** -0,0027 -0,0018 -0,0016 
Oil & Gas 1,0059*** 0,0004 -0,0001 0,0014 
Personal & Household Goods 0,8399*** -0,0042*** -0,0019** -0,0036** 
Real Estate 0,8134*** 0,0093* 0,0061 0,0045* 
Retail 0,7578*** -0,0025 0,0000 -0,0020 
Technology 0,8827*** -0,0070* -0,0049* -0,0051* 
Telecommunications 0,7892*** 0,0026* 0,0011 0,0007 
Travel & Leisure 0,7815*** -0,0036 -0,0000 -0,0029 
Utilities 0,8787*** 0,0005 -0,0015 0,0021 
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  Market Monetary Surprise 
Sector MSCI EMU Index Unconventional Surprise 
Automobile & Parts 1,0231*** 0,0385* 
Banks 1,3932*** -0,0687*** 
Basic Resources 1,2956*** 0,0518*** 
Chemicals 0,9409*** 0,0308* 
Construction & Materials 1,1323*** 0,0158** 
Financial Services 0,9711*** 0,0394*** 
Food & Beverages 0,6223*** -0,0091 
Healthcare 0.6618*** 0,0119 
Industrial Goods & Services 1,0158*** 0,0385*** 
Insurance 1,2352*** -0,0085* 
Media 0,7391*** 0,0132 
Oil & Gas 1,0067*** 0,0039 
Personal & Household Goods 0,8405*** 0,0162** 
Real Estate 0,8178*** 0,0042 
Retail 0,7577*** -0,0065 
Technology 0,8868*** 0,0487*** 
Telecommunications 0,7886*** -0,0114*** 
Travel & Leisure 0,7836*** 0,0245*** 
Utilities 0,8809*** 0,0137 
All regressions are estimated with Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags. The “Unconventional 
Surprise” dummy measures the change in spread between German and Italian 10-year bond yields during 
the days of “Important Announcements”. * Denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes 
significance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
